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GOVERNMENT BIRTH
CONTROL:
REPLY TO MR. SIRILLA, S.J.
WILLIAM

B.

BALL*

Background to a Controversy
s HAS BEEN NOTED, divergent views have been taken by Father
Hanley and myself on the interesting subject of government
birth control. It is gratifying to note that in some ways the divergence
has decreased: the position expressed by Father Hanley in his May
6, 1966 statement before the National Conference on Family Planning'
is closer in significant respects to my own position than was his
original position on the subject, expressed in statements which he
made August 9, 1965 before the Family Law Section of the American
Bar Association 2 and August 24, 1965 before the Gruening Com3
mittee.
Those earlier statements are of importance in the present controversy over government birth control in both its political and legal
aspects. Their political importance derives from the fact that the
controversy has arisen mainly out of objections raised by Roman
Catholic spokesmen. For decades, moreover, public disputes over
birth control have largely centered upon questions raised by Catholics.
Until very recently these disputes have concerned not sponsorship
by government of birth control programs but instead statutes penalizing
private birth control activity, whether by individuals or by private
clinics. Connecticut was long an arena of the most bitter controversy
Catholic support of the Connecticut statute
over such statutes.4
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making criminal the sale or use of contraceptives was based upon the Catholic
moral doctrine that contraception was
morally evil. It was about this pivotal
point of Catholic moral teaching on contraception that the whole Catholic public
objection swung. Later, when in Chicago,
New York City and at the federal
level, birth control activity by government began to appear, precisely the
same basis of objection was voiced
by Catholics.
The entry of government into the field, however, was also
defended by Catholics, and most notable
was the defense presented by Father
Hanley before the ABA. Father Hanley's
ABA statement included a statement
signed by fifty-seven Catholic laymen and
clergymen which asserted it to be legitimate public policy for government to
"give information and medical assistance
concerning medically accepted forms of
family planning." 5
What was arresting both about the
statement of the fifty-seven Catholics, as
well as about the text of Father Hanley
in which it was quoted, was the fact that
both the laymen and Father Hanleyprecisely like the aforementioned Catholic
spokesmen on birth control legislation
-saw
the Catholic moral teaching on
contraception as the sole issue involved.
Neither of the two groups seemed able
to resist the magnetic pull of this single
point. This parochialism has dogged the
government birth control question down
5Quoted

by Hanley in Hearings on S. 1676
Before a Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1273, 1275 (1965).

to the present hour. Catholics upon both
sides of the issue have seemed to be unable to think of it except in terms of the
morality, under Catholic doctrine, of contraception. This narrow focus of concern
upon a public issue, while understandable,
scarcely comports with the spirit, now
emerging in the Roman Catholic Church,
of an increased interest in the common
good going beyond the bounds of specifically Catholic doctrinal or institutional
concerns. The statements of Father Hanley and the "57" indeed touched upon
the problem of governmental coercion
and of free choice, but they did so solely
in terms of governmental coercion of the
Catholic conscience, free choice for the
Catholic. Father Hanley's ABA statement, for example, recites:
The sticky point for many is in the fact
that, in so encouraging research and setting up programs the Government gives
information and materials on methods
which are deemed by many to be morally
objectionable."

Again:
While the people of the United States
may have a legitimate right to set up
• . .tax-supported programs for family
planning, this does not mean that
the program can be imposed willynilly
on the public. There must be, for instance, a recognition of the rights of those
who feel that certain practices are immoral.'

The "57," on the subject of coercion
and free choice, also limited themselves
to considerations of the morality, under
Catholic doctrine, of contraception. What
is remarkable in all of this earlier careful
comment upon government birth control
is its failure to look beyond the moral
6

Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

7 Id.

at 1276.

(Emphasis added.)
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position of the Roman Catholic who is
on public assistance and to even so much
as ask whether there might exist any other
problem respecting government birth control for the poor generally. These statements said, in effect: "If only the Catholic is taken care of, government not merely
can, but should, later enter into birth
control programs for the poor." And
this meant at best relatively little because
of the low percentage of Catholics on the
public assistance rolls or living in target
areas for anti-poverty programs. The
statements were even more baffling in
their insouciance respecting the poor and
their total lack of awareness that any
problem of invasion of privacy could conceivably be involved in government
family-planning programs for the poor.
To the "57" and to Father Hanley no
problems whatever were posed by these
considerations. More exactly, these were
not considerations at all.
That they were not considerations at
all seems most unfortunate in view of the
special place which the poor occupy in
the Christian tradition, and in view of
the present mounting concern of the
Catholic Church over the right of privacy,
the sacredness of the right of generation,
the dignity and individuality of persons
in relation to the state, the integrity of
the family. If serious thought were devoted to the topic of governmental family
planning, it was at least conceivable that
Catholic spokesmen, addressing themselves to the public upon an issue which
they, at any rate, deemed so significant,
would at least have speculated upon problems which the government programs
might raise relating to the poor and their
privacy. Since Father Hanley and several
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of the "57" were attorneys, they might
also have pondered the propriety (or
legality) of effectuating these programs
by executive order rather than through
legislative processes. And in their overall
consideration of the programs, they might
have done some public wondering over
the advisability of the including of un-

married persons in them, the legal definition of the term "family planning" and
the possible relationship of such programs
to those ends of population control which
their proponents so continually emphasize. Yet not a single one of these grave
matters came into the scope of the statements.
Father Hanley's address of May 6 before the National Conference of Family
Planning, while failing to address itself to
several of these fundamental questions,
nevertheless had the merit of at last conceding that the coercion-privacy issue is
a valid issue to be dealt with. His paper
amounted, indeed, to a justification of government birth control in principle, while
hedging that principle about with numerous concerns respecting coercion and
rights of privacy. It was principally
these issues with which my testimony before the Gruening Committee in August,
1965 had dealt. Those of us who originally argued that government birth control
programs give rise to these issues can be
gratified that such issues are now receiving attention.
It is clear that these issues, moreover,
do not involve the problem now being
considered by Pope Paul, relating to the
deliberations of the Papal Commission on
birth control. For the same reason, a
position taken on these issues by churchmen, militating against adoption of given
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programs,

should not be subject to the charge that
such position is an attempt to impose one
particular religious group's morality upon
everyone.
Testimony Before Gruening
Committee

My testimony before the Gruening
Committee was that of an attorney representing one particular religious group,
namely, the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, an agency jointly created by the
eight Catholic dioceses of Pennsylvania.
I was at the same time officially authorized to state that my testimony "has been
reviewed by the National Catholic Welfare
Conference and is made with its express
approval."'8 In the capacity of attorney I
argued for a position taken unanimously,
after much deliberation, by the Catholic
bishops of Pennsylvania.

.

The crux of

that position is found in the following
words in my testimony:
[W]e believe that if the power and pres-

tige of government is placed behind programs aimed at providing birth control
services for the poor, coercion necessarily

results and violations of human privacy
9
become inevitable.
Mr. Sirilla, after examining reasons which
I advanced on behalf of this position, goes
on to present the position taken by Father
Hanley at the same hearing on the same
day. While he describes our testimony
as "conflicting," he fails to show that
there was any real conflict between Father
Hanley and myself upon that point. As
I have pointed out, and as Mr. Sirilla
Hearings on S. 1676 Before a Subcommittee
on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Senate
Committee on Government Operations, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1273, 1295-96 (1965).
9Id. at 1300-01.
s

points out, Father Hanley's testimony
dealt solely with the availability of free
choice to persons whose moral principles
rule out contraception-Catholics, in
other words. Father Hanley's testimony
never touched upon the privacy issues
raised in my testimony. That makes comparison of our respective testimonies
largely impossible. Mr. Sirilla nevertheless attempts the impossible by examining
my arguments respecting the right of
privacy and comparing them with Father
Hanley's arguments about religious freedom. He precedes this, however, by a
discussion of what is meant by coercion
in the premises, beginning with an analogy
to the school prayer cases which I employed. He is entirely correct in his statement that these cases were formally decided upon the basis of the establishment
clause of the first amendment. I had
described at considerable length this holding in a two-part series of articles in The
Catholic Lawyer in 1962 and have recognized it in other articles since published. 0
Mr. Sirilla, however, stops at the surface
of these decisions and fails to ask why
it might be that the Court found "establishment" in the school situations it there
examined. I think there can be no answer
other than because it found children in
these situations. It seems most unlikely that

the Court would declare publicly sponsored praying in legislatures an unconstitutional practice. The federal chaplain10 Ball, The School Prayer Case: Dilemma of
Disestablishment, 8 CATHOLIC LAW. 182 (1962);
Ball, The School Prayer Case: What Course
for the Future, 8 CATHOLIC LAW. 286 (1962);
Ball, The Prayer Amendments-A Catholic
Lawyer's View, 199 CATHOLIC WORLD 345
(1964); Ball, Religion in Education: A Basis
for Consensus, 108 AMERICA 528 (1963).

12
cies go constitutionally unchallenged.
Who is affected and in what situation
appears to be the key to the question of
whether there is an establishment of religion. The school prayer decisions appear to tell us that even a breath of state
sponsorship of religion, in the situation in
which child and state (personalities vastly
unequal in power) encounter one another,
is to be categorized as invasive and forbidden, that is, as an establishment. No
one, then, will be put to having to show
coercion. The Court was undoubtedly
aware that proof of coercion in such a
situation is extremely difficult. It would
not be a simple thing to get child witnesses
to provide reliable answers (in relation to
public school religious programs) to such
questions as: "Were you coerced? Did
you feel teacher made you or wanted you
to recite the Bible verses?" The Court,
with great practicality, avoided the problem, but achieved protection of the child,
by declaring a ban, across the board, on
all such practices. The Court, in Engel
v. Vitale, in resting its decision upon the
establishment clause, pointed out the "indirect coercive pressure" resulting "when
the power, prestige and financial support
of government is placed behind a particular religious belief. . . ."I' The Court
in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp' 2
recited at length quotations from the expert testimony adduced at the trial showing psychological harm alleged to be done
to children by the religious practices there
in question. Stating its doctrine of "neutrality," it said:
And a further reason for this neutrality
is found in the Free Exercise Clause,
11370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
12374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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which recognizes the value of religious
training, teaching and observance and,
more particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own course with
reference thereto, free of any compulsion
from the state.'Mr. Sirilla, on the contrary, gives us to
understand that coercion would not be
constitutionally significant in a case involving the state and children in relation
to religion. Here I should commend to
14
him the reading of Meyer v. Nebraska,'
Pierce v. Society of Sisters," and other
cases expressive of the extreme sensitivity
of our courts to child-state relationships.
Thus a comparison between the situation found in the school prayer cases and
the public assistance-birth control situation appears both valid and useful.
Mr. Sirilla next reveals, however, his
unfamiliarity with the right of privacy as
my testimony had argued it. How widely
he missed my point is seen in the following statement in his article:
If his [Mr. Ball's] reference to these
cases implicitly meant that he felt government supported family-planning programs would be a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment
and thereby indirectly coerce the consciences of the minority, it would still be
necessary to show how the activity in
question, in its purpose and primary effect, is one that advances or inhibits
religion.
This shows that Mr. Sirilla, too, is so
magnetized by concerns over "Catholic
rights," that he cannot see that some
other rights (say, the right of privacy of
non-Catholics) could possibly have entered into my head to discuss.
13

Id.

at 222.

1.262 U.S. 390 (1923).
13268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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Mr. Sirilla similarly analyzes Griswold
v. Connecticut'6 primarily from the point
of view of the Catholic moral doctrine of
contraception. He points out that S. 1676
"does not favor any particular method or
methods as did the Connecticut statute. . . ." He thus misses not only the
significance of the Griswold case but also
of the argument which I derived from it.
I had simply said that the Court in
Griswold essayed at length upon the right
of privacy and, in particular, this right in
the conjugal relationship. The teaching
of Griswold has the plainest relevance to
governmental programs of birth control.
On this, however, I am not sure where
either Mr. Sirilla or Father Hanley stand.
Do they say that this teaching is not of
relevance to such programs?
I find myself in total disagreement with
Mr. Sirilla's statement that, since "the
poor, in recent years, are becoming more
aware of their legal and constitutional
rights," it may be questioned "whether a
general practice of coercion and invasion
of the right of privacy of the poor in birth
control programs, as feared by Mr. Ball,
would occur or whether it could continue
without being effectively challenged."
Here we differ deeply in our estimation
of what may be fairly generalized as the
psychological condition not merely of the
poor, but, categorically, of those poor
who are on public assistance. If one will
admit that the person on public assistance
has absolutely nothing with which to bargain, one must also admit as a fact that
psychological factors of mental acuteness
and personal confidence are often entirely
lacking in these people. Father Hanley's
11381 U.S. 479 (1965).

statement of May 6, 1966, comes very
close to my own, in this regard, when he
says: "Great ingenuity and persistent efforts will be required to eliminate indirect

coercion .

"17

Unhappily, neither he

nor Mr. Sirilla give us any detailed statement of the administrative techniques
whereby such indirect coercion will be
avoided. I do not deny that here there
is an area for searching discussion by
lawyers, but I do remark that while there
is much blithe reference to "adequate protections" there has been no spelling out
of these by those who advocate government birth control programming.
Father Hanley and Mr. Sirilla both accept as a fact that there exists a population explosion necessitating population
control. Respecting this assumption, two
questions need to be raised so far as state
or federal governmental birth control
questions are concerned. The first question goes to the facts of the assumed explosion. Speculation concerning world
population growth gives rise to many sorts
of questions. The population density of
India is less than that of West Germany
(which is importing people).
Some
American states are losing population,
while in many states open space is increasing as urban center populations increase.
What density of population or rate of
population increase furnishes a reason for
governmental population control programs? Jurisdictionally, may density or
growth in New Jersey (or in India or
Switzerland) afford justification for a popReligious and Political Values in
Population Policies 5. Paper presented before
17 Hanley,

National Conference on Family Planning: Partners for Progress, Washington, D.C., May 6,
1966.
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ulation control policy in Missouri? Such
questions are not idle. Pennsylvania's
Department of Public Welfare embarked
last December upon a broad birth control program for people on public assistance upon the stated justification of the
"world-wide population explosion."'"
Where, as in Pennsylvania, the public
authority states that its program is aimed
at reducing the population explosion, and
where the total impact of that program
is limited to the single group of the poor,
are we not justified in resisting such a
program? I should think that this would
be a first essential. Where the proponents
ot such programs have manifested sufficient
civic responsibility to attempt to include
in the programs administrative protections,
the latter should of course be carefully
and fairly examined. Here I should remark that failure to examine specific programs is one of the singular failings of
those who have been defending government birth control in principle. For the
attorney, such examination means at least
three things so far as government birth
control programs are concerned: (a) to
inquire whether the program is actually
legally authorized; (b) to evaluate the
provisions of the program; (c) to, in that
connection, see whether the terms and
standards set forth in the program are
certain in meaning or whether, perchance,
they possibly contain, by virtue of vagueness, grants of power unduly broad.
As to legal authorization, one of the
more unsavory aspects of government
birth control programs has been the fact
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that, with few exceptions,"9 they have
been bootlegged into public policy through
the back door of executive order rather
than through legislative deliberation and
enactment. The programs have been variously justified as personal health,20
societal "health," 1 welfare, 2 and population control measures 23 under broad definitions of these terms or no definition of
these terms. 24 S. 1676 has at least the
merit of being a legislative proposal,
Senator Gruening recognizing (as some
agencies of the federal government have
not) that anything so distinctive and significant in nature as a worldwide population control scheme ought, if adopted by
the United States, first to pass legislative
testing.
As to evaluation of programs, it is to
be feared that a psychology is taking hold
in the United States that government birth
control programs, assumedly so completely in the good interests of humanity,
should be immune to evaluative processes
prior to adoption. That is to say, that
1

See, for example, COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-20-1;

IOWA CODE ANN. § 234.21-28; KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 23-501-02; NEV. REV. STAT. § 422.
20 E.g., New York (Policies and Standards Governing Provisions of Medical Care, Section 1400,
April 20, 1965, State of New York Department
ot Social Welfare).
21 E.g., Chapter III, Section B, Page la, Maine
Public Assistance Policy Manual, March 1, 1966.
22 E.g., Pennsylvania (Policy of the Department of Public Welfare Concerning Family

Planning, Pennsylvania Office of Public Assistance Memorandum No. 870, December 17,
1965).
23 Ibid.

24 "Family planning" is undefined in New York's
18 Policy of the Department of Public Welfare

Concerning Family Planning, Pennsylvania Of-

fice of Public Assistance Memorandum No. 870,
December 17, 1965.

regulations. New York Policies and Standards
Governing Provisions of Medical Care, Section
1400, April 20, 1965, State of New York Department of Social Welfare.
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government birth control is a thing good
in itself. The "57" qualified this by a
plea for protection of Roman Catholics:
beyond this they could apparently imagine no sort of objection to any sort of
program. The recently adopted birth control program of Pennsylvania permits initiation of birth control discussion by a
caseworker who subjectively determines
that the public assistance recipient has a
"serious problem of family functioning."2 5
Since traditionally in Pennsylvania, great
significance had been attached to the power of the state to initiate such discussion
(in view of concerns respecting governmental persuasion of the poor), the delegation of an unbounded power to determine "serious problems of family functioning" was not improperly a basis for
legal concern.
As to definition of terms, it is apparent
that no less care should be taken for certainty in terms in the field of government
birth control than in the field, say, of industry regulation. Due precisely to the
fact that families are involved in "family
planning," I should think that the bar
should insist upon a definition of that
term in any statute or regulation employing it. As a simple legal fact, no one
knows what it means, how much or how
little it encompasses. Father Hanley never questions whether it may be, on the
one hand, a palatable euphemism for birth
control or, on the other, perhaps a prescription to a state agent to take upon
himself the reordering of a series of personal (including sexual) relationships

which fail, according to the caseworker's
lights, of proper "functioning." Mr. Sirilla
never once, in comment upon the Gruening Bill, asks himself or tells us what is
meant by the term "population control"
which it so prominently employs. If the
answer of either is that we must repose
trust in "the capabilities of men of good
will," 26 1 would agree-afterwe have done
our job as lawyers to see that the capabilities of both the good-willed and the
bad-willed are reasonably confined in reasonably clear terminology.
These three points, I believe, represent
the functions of law in relation to government birth control. The rest is policy.
Law, however, can play a role in guiding
policy. Insights and ideas borrowed from
many areas of our constitutional jurisprudence may be useful in informing public policy. Such was the purpose of my
allusions to various areas of our constitutional law where the weak and the distressed encountered the state. The legal
problem chiefly posed by government
birth control programs for the poor is not
a problem in Bills and Notes to be
straightjacketed in mechanical concepts of
precedents. To urge that, in considering
rights of privacy in these programs, one
may not borrow from constitutional cases
arising in other than government birth
control cases-say, in criminal cases-is
to exhibit unfamiliarity with the methods
of constitutional adjudication long pursued by our courts. Look, indeed, to the
(Continued on page 267)

25 Policy

of the Department of Public Welfare
Concerning Family Planning, Pennsylvania Of-

2CHanley, Religious and Political Values in
Population Policies 5. Paper presented before
National Conference on Family Planning: Part-

fice of Public Assistance Memorandum No.
870, December 17, 1965.

ners for Progress, Washington, D.C., May 6,
1966.

